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“Rawls second principle of justice: The welfare of the worst-off 
individual is to be maximized before all others, and the only 
way inequalities can be justified is if they improve the welfare 
of this worst-off individual or group. By simple extension, given 
that the worst-off is in his best position, the welfare of the   
second worst-off will be maximized, and so on. The difference 
principle produces a lexicographical ordering of the welfare 
levels of individuals from the lowest to highest.” Cit. Public 
Choice III, Dennis C. Mueller, p.600 
1. Introduction 
Since publishing in 1950 “The bargaining problem” by John F. Nash, Jr. its framework 
has been developed in different directions. Such was the Martin Osborn and 
Ariel Rubinstein “Bargaining and Markets” monograph (1990), where the Nash original 
“axiomatic” idea was extended to incorporate a “strategic” bargaining process as it actu-
ally happens in real life, and where the “time shortage” for the bargainers is the major fac-
tor encouraging agreements. A lot of bargaining problem varieties, decades after the Nash 
discovery, has been under the “loop” of many game theoreticians, where the bargaining 
problem solution did not necessarily comply with all Nash axioms. Beyond any doubt, 
“Nonsymmetrical Solution”, Kalai (1977); “Bargaining under Incomplete Information”, 
Hursanyi (1967); “Experimental Bargaining”, Roth (1985); “Bargaining and Coalition”, 
Hart (1985) etc., can extend this list to convince the reader once again in fundamental im-
portance of bargaining theory. 
Bargaining and rational choice mechanisms are related issues and such they are in our 
case. Along the lines of general choice theory the choice act can be formalized in two dif-
                                                           
*  Monotonic Systems idea, different from all known ideas with the same name, was initially introduced in 
http://www.datalaundering.com/download/modular.pdf.  
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ferent languages known as internal and external descriptions. Internal description uses the 
language of binary relations while the external explains the same properties on the set 
theoretical level. Both the internal and the external descriptions deal with the same object 
highlighting it from different angles. The Nash Bargaining Problem and its Solution   
express exactly the same phenomenon. Given a list of axioms, like “Pareto Efficiency” or 
“Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives”, in terms of binary relations, which the rational 
actors must follow, the solution necessarily is a scalar optimization on the set of alterna-
tives. Exactly, the scalar optimization keeps the secret of whole Nash’s axiomatic   
approach and its success in performing the calculus of bargaining solution. In connection 
with the bargaining, as well, the motive of our paper is to report a “calculus” of bargaining 
solution on large Boolean tables and some theoretical foundations offered by the method. 
Unfortunately we met a lot of difficulties in following the Nash’s scenario. 
Boolean table representation discloses the real life “cacophonous” into relatively simple 
and understandable data format. However, it complicates the picture allowing the scalar 
optimization not to be unique. Moreover, we are dealing here with an object purely atomic 
without any hope from the first glance to implement the “invariance under the change of 
scale of utilities” property in the proofs. From the researcher’s point of view the situation 
fails from incertitude of what type scalar criteria suits best – the Nash axiomatic approach 
suggest the product of utilities removing the situation incertitude once and for all from any 
discussion. Nevertheless, we believe that a reasonable solution under the jurisdiction of 
our method might come into consideration while for the game-analyst to enroll the method 
into the arsenal of game analysis tools will be an advantage. 
In the next section we present the main example of our bargaining game. In addition, we 
illustrate, in the appendix, also, a different bargaining on Boolean Tables between the coa-
lition and its moderator using some conventional characteristic functions. Certain items in 
the main example, like signals or misrepresentations, should not be understood as a pri-
mary topic of our discussion. These items must rather be understood as an illustration of 
bargaining process complexity. In the third section we try to explain our intentions in 
more rigorous way. Here we formulate our “Bargaining Problem on Boolean Tables” in 
pure strategies raising the foundation for section 4, where we are going to exploit our pure 
Pareto frontier in terms of so-called Monotonic Systems chain-nested alternatives – the 
Frontier Theorem. In order to implement the Nash theorem for nonsymmetrical solution,  
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Kalai 1977, in the Section 5, we introduce acceptable backbreaking algorithm in general 
form. Despite the lotteries are not allowed upon Boolean Tables subsets of pure strategies 
and which do not necessary arrange a convex collection of feasible alternatives as usual, 
we claim anyway that the algorithm will find an acceptable solution. At last, as promised 
above, the Section 6 corresponds to an elementary attempt to formulate a regular approach 
of coalition formation under the coalition formation supervisor – the moderator. Exactly, 
this attempt visualized on Figure 2, explain the notation vocabulary of chain-nested alter-
natives prevailed in our Monotonic Systems theory, see also Section 4. Section 7 explains 
the whole story alongside of independent heuristic interpretation. In few words we con-
clude the study, Section 8. 
2. Example. 
It is now almost a common truth that companies needs to promote employees healthy 
life styles become significant in their effectiveness of marketing and merchandising   
efforts. Possible outcome of such efforts might occasionally be a voluntary solution, 
which results that employees in the company be keyed up to leave the company. In the 
following we blow things out of all proportions, but the reader may found it informative to 
trace the interaction of interests between employees and the company, which takes into 
account the nature of health-damaging behaviors. Contrary to the efficiency of a voluntary 
solution, what our solution is not, we still hope that we are at right advancing in the direc-
tion of self-governing decision-making process.  
Suppose, that the manager of a company “Well-Being” apparently is determined to 
avoid disability compensations. Manager hopes to reduce company losses with regard to 
lost working hours. To find employees behaviors the manager has recommended proceed-
ing with an inspection. Inspection disclosed that employees have some health-damaging 















 Empl. nr.1    ○  ○     2 
 Empl. nr.2  ○  ○   ○  ○  4 
 Empl. nr.3    ○  ○  ○   3 
 Empl. nr.4  ○  ○   ○  ○  4 
 Empl. nr.5    ○  ○   2 
 Empl. nr.6  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  5 
 Empl. nr.7    ○  ○     2 
 Total  3 6  5  5 3  22  
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The manager asked the employees to stop such negative life style and they promised to 
hold up with ○-behaviors and to live up totally to 22 promises. The manager believes the 
employees and is apparently positive that all these ○-entries will disappear from the list in 
the follow-up inspection as declined ⊗-behaviors. In addition, the manager explained that 
all are free to self-govern or to broke their promises without any penalties. In so doing, 
however, the manager is aware about employees’ unreliable human nature in keeping to 
their promises. Therefore, the manager decides to award employees who do change their 
life style in positive direction and projected to organize them into a “Health Club”. He  
established a fund for awards payoffs, max 12 bank notes, to cover the awards expenses. 
Follow-up inspection of a particular behavior (column), to his knowledge, has its firm 
price, f. e. 1, but his account of follow-up inspections as to how much credit will be avail-
able, for some reason, is under budget constraint 4 = . 
The first rule in force will be to award an employee by a bank note who will not broke 
his promises at least at k  promises among all ○-entries in the row of the Table 1, as the 
employee promised to decline. The manager decided not inform in advance how many 
declined  ⊗-entries will be actually chosen in the award decision k . This secret, the   
manager thinks, will be rather more than less encouraging over rational employees to keep 
to their promises. However, he/she thinks, that to preserve the effectiveness of the project, 
it will be acceptable to circumvent inspection of behaviors (columns) with only few 
⊗-promises, because of budget constraint for inspection. For this reason to act as the  
manager desired, i.e. to diminish inspection expenses, by the second rule in force, a   
Moderator of the club will be awarded personally depending on the following rule.   
Moderator’s award basket will be equal to the number of club members with the lowest 
number of promises fulfilled by the club members’, i.e., by the emptiest ⊗-column in the 
table of inspections. Moreover, to encourage a collective responsibility as coming   
members of the club not to “spring off in the long run” out of promises the manager  
proposed the third rule in force that the coming club regulation must emanate a threat: all 
awards, inclusive Moderator’s personal award, will be lost if some club member does not 
keep to his/her promises – still declining less than k  ⊗-entries in the follow-up inspection. 
Note, that if no one of club members’ keeps to a promise, an outsider might keep to a 
promise to come over his/her negative behaviors, as the outsider promised in the past. 
These promises fulfilled by outsiders do not count what so ever in Moderator’s award! 
Let us look more closely at Moderator’s and club members’ behaviors with regard to the 
awards. It is clear, as we already noticed, that highly rational employees would try to  
decline rather more than fewer behaviors from the list, as they promised, in order to   
reduce the risk not to be awarded with a higher k -decision. So, the members of coming  
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club (members with higher health standards) will certainly count on higher k ’s and there-
fore they will try to prevent others – those with relatively low “health standards” and   
having relatively lower k ’s – to become the members of the club. Mind that all members 
and the Moderator personally will loose the awards if a club member in the long run  
intends to broke too many ⊗-promises, i.e. to fulfill less than k  promises. On the other 
hand, Moderator’s personal award basket might be quite empty if the number k  is   
relatively high. Below we illustrate the last statement by example. 
Let us take a look at the Table 1 and let the award will be granted at  2 or    1 = k . The 
manager expects that by fulfilling promises all ○-behaviors in Table 1 (all 22○-entries 
will turn into 22⊗-entries) every employee will become a member of the club: i.e. the 
most preferable solution, voluntary, f. e. by other means. Indeed, each of them is to be 
awarded by a bank note. Nevertheless, the manager cannot afford the project due to budget 
constraint: the follow-up inspection expenses are 5. The Moderator’s award basket size 
equals to 3. On the other hand, the Moderator may persuade the coming members of the 
club not to keep to their promises at “Too much Smoking” and “Heavy-Fat food”. All club 
members will still preserve their well-earned awards, sounds the Moderator’s argument. 
This solution, as everyone can see, is in interests of both: The Moderator award increases 
from 3 to 5, and the manager expenses on inspection drop from 5 to 3; only 3 columns 
have to be inspected instead of 5 in compliance with the budget constraint 4 = , see the 
Table 2 below. 









Total  Fast  Food 
Overweight 
Total
 Empl. nr.1  ⊗  ⊗   2    ⊗ 1 
 Empl. nr.2  ⊗  ⊗ 2    ⊗ 1 
 Empl. nr.3  ⊗  ⊗  ⊗ 3    ⊗ 1 
 Empl. nr.4  ⊗  ⊗ 2    ⊗ 1 
 Empl. nr.5    ⊗  ⊗ 2     0 
 Empl. nr.6  ⊗  ⊗  ⊗ 3    ⊗ 1 
 Empl. nr.7  ⊗  ⊗   2    ⊗ 1 
 Total  6 5 5  16    6  6 
One can also notice that the total award expenses may now rise up to maximum 12 
bank notes. However, someone from the board may insist that the proposal to vote for 
1 = k  is undesirable from an additional intersection since the Moderator can misrepresent 
the members’ behaviors. Indeed, by this action the Moderator may offer one bank note to  
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a board member for signaling about the decision  1 = k . Now, the Moderator by knowing 
1 = k  may propose to the club members not to decline all bad behaviors except one – the 
“Fast Food Overweight”. What's more, the Moderator may compensate nr.5 employee 
losses by one bank note
1. If not, the employee nr.5 is at right to receive an award since he 
may keep to his promises about ○-entries other than “Fast Food Overweight”, and there-
fore the employee nr.5 may threaten to send a signal to the board regarding Moderator’s 
fraud. Moderator’s award in this case, following the regulation rules in force (see Table 3), 
will be 6  minus 1 for the signal, and minus 1 for the compensation. That makes 4 what 
is greater than 3, as the Table 1 suggests. Thus, the board may follow the line of reason-
ing for the counter argument to the proposal  1 = k  and to insist on the decision  3 ≥ k  in 
order to prevent Moderator’s misrepresentation (fraud). 
One may argue that  3 ≥ k  yields a negligible effect to preserve healthy life style for the 
reason of undesirable behaviors of employees’ nr.  5 3 1 , ,  and 7. These employees will be 
excluded from the “Health Club” and will be free once again to self-govern or to break 
promises (without any penalties as we already know) regarding their behaviors. However, 
someone may counter argue that, if the exclusion of employees’ nr.  5 3 1 , ,  and 7 happens, 
as anyone can see from the Table 4 below, the remaining employees  4 2,  and 6  will still 
















 Empl. Nr.2  ⊗  ⊗   ⊗  ⊗ 4 
 Empl. Nr.4  ⊗  ⊗   ⊗  ⊗ 4 
 Empl. Nr.6  ⊗  ⊗  ⊗  ⊗  ⊗ 5 
Total  3 3  1  3  3  13 
Now the Moderator’s award basket equals 1, since the employee nr.6  alone prefers to 
decline “Little or No Motion”. The awards expenses will decrease from 10 to 4. There-
fore, the manager may compromise with the Moderator to increase his award to 3,  
excluding “Little or No motion” from the inspection list in Table 4, since the inspection of 
“Little or No Motion” with only one employee nr.6 exceeds the budget by 1 anyway. Note 
that the total expenses for awards, inclusive moderator, increase once again to 6 , see  
Table 5; c.f. the suggestion above not to decline “Too much Smoking” and “High-Fat 
food” behaviors. 
                                                           
1 Quite unpleasant suggestion.  















Empl. nr.2  ⊗  ⊗  ⊗  ⊗ 4 
Empl. nr.4  ⊗  ⊗  ⊗  ⊗ 4 
 Empl. nr.6  ⊗  ⊗  ⊗  ⊗ 4 
 Total  3 3  3 3  12 
Is this decision rational? Suppose not, and let  5 = k  is the company’s board proposal. 
Now, only the employee nr.6 is a potential participant in the project, see Table 6. 
Table 6 











 Empl. nr.6  ⊗  ⊗  ⊗  ⊗  ⊗ 5 
 Total  1 1  1  1  1  5 
The Moderator may disagree to organize “Health Club”, because his award is only one 
bank note. From the other side, it is not exactly the manager’s motive to exceed the budget 
on inspection to inspect all 5 behaviors with only one potential employee in keeping to his 
promises. The manager decides to vote against  5 = k  proposal at the company’s board. 
To reach a conclusion, the basic nature of manager’s difficulty to make a decision lies in 
between to pick up a row in the following table: 














Table 1  7 3  0  0  10  2  5 
Table 2  7 5  0  0  12  0  3 
Table 3  6 4  1  1  12  0  1 
Table 4  3 1  0  0  4  8  5 
Table 5  3 3  0  0  6  6  4 
Table 6  1 1  0  0  2  10 5 
Below, to make the difficulty crystal clear, we visualize the manager difficulty by a   
bargaining game to share 12 Bank Notes between: (i) – the moderator, and (ii) – the club 
members.  




Our section ends here without telling the whole truth what was the decision k  at the 
board meeting. We will tell the truth in rigorous vocabulary in next sections. Only a   
closing topic to interrupt our pleasant story for a moment is necessary
2. 
Let our three actors have been engaged in interaction: employees N , moderator in 
charge of club formation and the manager. Certain sublist of employees x  from the list 
{}     n ,... i ,..., N 1 =   −  the coming members of the club, 
N x 2 ∈ , have expressed their   
willingness to drop certain Behaviors from the list  y, 
M y 2 ∈ ,  {}     m ,..., j ,..., M 1 = . Let a 
Boolean table 
m
n ij a W   =  reflects the inspection result of employees’ behaviors;  1 = ij a  
if employee i keeps a promise  j,  0 = ij a  if not. Also 
M 2  lists of allegedly subsidized 
behaviors 
M y 2 ∈  have been examined. 
We can calculate the moderator payoff  ) H ( Fk  using a subtable H  on crossing entries 
of the rows x  and columns  y in the original table W  by further selection of a column 
with the least number  ) H ( Fk  from the list  y. The number of 1-entries in each column 
                                                           
2   For those unwilling to continue with bargaining in next sections please pay attention to this closing remark. 












Club Size =  the Club Award
Revenue Function = the number of club 
members trying to keep to at least k 
promises and only this particular list of  
k  promises count in the manager 
award's decision in the follow up 
inspection; k = 1 . No any member 
(inclusive moderator) receives an award 
if some club member keeps less than  k  
promises.      
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belonging to  y determines the payoff  ) H ( Fk . Suppose that characteristic functions   
family  ) H ( ) y , x (
k k ν ν ≡ ,  {} max k ,..., k ,..., k 1 ∈ , on N  are known as well for the coali-
tion games depending on the parameter κ , in particular for every pair  G L ⊂ , 
M N G , L 2 2 × ∈ ; we suppose that  ) G ( ) L (
k k ν ν ≤ . One might find it not difficult to 
imagine that the manager payoff function  ) H ( fk  has a single ∩ -peakedness shape within 
the line of decisions  max k ,..., k ,..., 1 ;  ) H ( fk  reflects some kind of positive effect on the 
company deeds. Sponsor expenses will be equal to  ) H ( f ) H ( k
k + ν . 
Finally, we share some ideas for reasonable solution of our game. The situation is   
similar to the Nash Bargaining Problem from 1950, where two partners – the club mem-
bers and the moderator try to find a fair agreement. It is possible to find the Bargaining 
solution  {}
M N
k H S 2 2 × = ∈  for each particular decision k , see next sections. However, 
the choice of the number k  is something different. We have pointed out in the example 
that the choice  4 = k ,5 may be useful from some ex-ante reasoning. Maximum payoffs 
are guaranteed for the partners when the choice  1 = k . Counting on that decision is   
irrational, because here only one behavior will be “materialized” as promised by   
maximum number of employees, but without a positive effect  ) S ( f k  on the health deeds 
in general. The choice of higher k  is either counterproductive – a lot of different health-
damaging behaviors will be dropped as desired, but only by relatively low number of em-
ployees, what is useful only for the sponsor in saving awards funds. For example, for 
max k k =  an employee with the largest list of preferred  max k  behaviors to decline might 
become the only member of the club. As it seems to us the situation here is like a median 
voter scheme, see Barbera et. al., 1993. However, a consultation in this “white field” is 
necessary.  




3.  Bargaining game on Boolean Tables 
Suppose that employees who intend to participate in company game have been inter-
viewed in order to reveal their preferences. The resulting data can then be arranged in 
m n ×  table  ij W α = , where the entry  1 = ij α  if an employee i keeps to a promise to 
hold up with health-damaging behavior  j,  0 = ij α , if not. In this respect, the primary  
table W  is a collection of Boolean columns, where each column is filled with Boolean 
elements from only one particular behavior pattern. In the context of the bargaining game, 
we discuss an interaction between the health club and the moderator. The club choice x is 
a subset of rows  n ,..., i ,..., 1  - the coming members of the club, and a subset  y of col-
umns  m ,... j ,..., 1  is the moderator’s choice – the coming list of declined behaviors as 
promised. The result of interaction is a subtable H  or a block. This block represents the 
players’ joint anticipation () y , x . The players: Nr.1 – the club, and player nr.2 – the mod-
erator, both of them, has in mind to receive the awards. Employees approve our three 
awards regulation 
3. Despite that both players are interested in company well-being activi-
ties their objectives are different. The player nr.1 objective might be for each member of 
the club a higher fulfillment of promises. The player nr.2, the moderator’s objective, might 
be the higher fulfillment of promises per particular behavior pattern. Let the utility pair 
() ) y ( F ), x ( v  highlights the players’ payoff. Players have in mind to bargain upon all 
possible anticipations () F , v . 
Our intention in developing a theoretical ground for our story is to follow the Nash’s 
(1950) axiomatic approach. Unfortunately, as it was noticed before, there are some   
fundamental difficulties in similar approach. Below we summarize these difficulties step 
by step putting forward an equivalent. We will consequently succeed in this direction 
where we first formulate the Nash’s axioms in their original vocabulary and then reexam-
ine their essence in our own vocabulary. Such advance along this way will be easier in 
raising the fundament of proofs in next sections. 
                                                           
3   We recall the main regulation that none club members, inclusive the moderator, receive their awards if certain club member partici-
pates in less than k  activities.  
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It is not a secret for anyone following Nash that “... we may define a two-person antici-
pation as a combination of two one-person anticipation. ... A probability combination of 
two two-person anticipations is defined by making the corresponding combinations for 
their components,” see Nash 1950, p. 157, Sen Axiom 8*1, p. 127 or sets of axioms, see 
also Luce and Raifa 1958, p.25, G. Owen 1968, section VII.2 , or von Neumann and  
Morgenstern 1947, utility index interpretation. Rigorously speaking the compactness and 
convexity of a feasible set S  of utility pairs ensures that any continuous and strictly  
convex function on S  reaches its maximum while convexity guarantees the maximum 
point uniqueness. 
Let us recall the other Nash axioms. The solution must comply with INV) invariance 
under the change of scale of utilities; IIA) independence of the irrelevant alternatives; and 
PAR) - Pareto efficiency. Note that following PAR the players object an outcome s when 
there is available an outcome  ' s  in which both of them are better off. We expect for play-
ers to act from a strong individual rationality principle SIR. An arbitrary set S  of the 
utility pairs  () 2 1 s , s s =  can be the outcome of the game. A disagreement event occurs at 
the point  () 2 1 d , d d =  where both of players obtain the lowest utility they count on – the 
status quo point. A bargaining problem is a pair  d , S
4 and there exists  S ∈ s  such that 
i i d s >  for  2 1, i =  and  S ∈ d . A bargaining solution is a function  ) d , ( f S  that assigns 
to every bargaining problem  d , S  a unique element of S . The bargaining solution  f  
satisfies SIR if  0 > ) d , ( f S  for every bargaining problem  d , S . 
Our secret, which guarantees the same properties, lies in the following. We define a fea-
sible set S  of anticipations, or in more convenient vocabulary, a feasible set S  of alter-
natives as a collection of table W  blocks: 
W 2 ⊆ S . Similar to disagreement event in 
Nash scheme we define an empty block ∅  to be a status quo option in any set of alterna-
tives  S , which we call the refusal of choice. Given any two alternatives H  and H′  in 
S  an alternative  H H ′ ∪  does belong to S . In other words the set S  of feasible alter-
natives in our case always arrange an upper semilattice. Moreover, if an alternative 
                                                           
4  We use the bold notifications S  close to the originals. Notification S  is preserved for stable point, see later.  
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S ∈ H  then it’s all subsets  S ⊆
H 2 . Although a room for discussion is at hand, we state 
that this is our equivalent to the convex property and will play the same role in proofs as it 
does in Nash scheme.  
The Nash theorem asserts that there is a unique bargaining solution  ) d , ( f S  for every 
bargaining problem  d , S , which maximizes the product of the players’ gains in the set 
S  of utility pairs ()S ∈ 2 1 s , s  over the disagreement outcome  () 2 1 d , d d = . This is so 
called symmetric bargaining solution which satisfies INV, IIA, PAR, and SYM – players 
symmetric identify, iff  
  () ( ) () () 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 d s d s max arg ) d , ( f s , s d , d − ⋅ − = ≤ S . (1) 
It is difficult to say ad hoc what properties can guarantee the uniqueness of similar solu-
tion on Boolean Tables. Nevertheless, in the next section we claim that our bargaining 
problem on 
W 2 ⊆ S  has the same symmetric or nonsymmetrical shape: 
 
θ θ −
∈ = ≡ ∅
1 ) H ( F ) H ( v max arg ) ( f ) , ( f H S S S  (2) 
for some  1 0 ≤ ≤ θ  provided that Nash axioms hold. 
4.  Theoretical aspects of the Boolean game 
Henceforth, the table  ij W α =  will be the Boolean table, see above, representing   
employees’ promises to attend company Behaviors. We suggest looking at H  rows x , 
symbolizing the coming members of the club participating in at least k  Behaviors. Behav-
iors arrange, what we call here, a column’s activity list  y,  ,... , k 3 2 = ;  k  is the award  
decision. For each activity in the activity list  y at least  ) H ( F  of club members intend to 
fulfill their promises. Let, for example, the number of rows in H  is the gain  ) H ( v  of 
player nr.1 – the club members –, while the gain of the player nr.2 – the moderator’s 
award – is  ) H ( F . 
Let us look at the bargaining problem in conjunction with players’ behaviors. The   
anticipations of the coming club members  x i∈  towards the activity list  y  can easily be 








α ,  x i∈ ,  y j∈ . Similarly, the  
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moderator’s anticipation towards the same activity list  y, can be “accumulated” by means 




ij j c α ,  y j∈ . 
We now consider the whole story in more rigorous mathematical form. Below we use 
the notation  W H ⊆ . The notation H  contained in W  will be understood in an ordinary 
set-theoretical vocabulary, where the Boolean table W  is a set of its Boolean 1-elements. 
All 0-elements will be dismissed from the consideration. Thus, H  as a binary relation is 
also a subset of W . Below, referring an element, we assume that it is a Boolean 
1-element. 
For an element  W ij ∈ ≡ α α  in the row i and column  j we use the similarity index 
j ij c = π , counting only on Boolean elements belonging to H ,  x i∈  and  y j∈ . The 
value of  j ij c = π  depends on each subset  W H ⊆  and we may therefore write 
) H , ( ij α π π π ≡ ≡ ; the set H  is called the π -function parameter. Our similarity indices 
ij π , as one can see, may only concurrently increase with the “expansion” and decrease 
with the “shrinking” of the parameter H . This leads us to the fundamental definition. 
Definition 1. Basic monotone property. By a Monotonic System will be understood a  
family 
W H : ) H , ( 2 ∈ α π   of π -functions, such that the set H  is to be considered as 
a parameter with the following monotone property: for two particular values 
W G , L 2 ∈ ,  G L ⊂  of the parameter H  the inequality  ) G , ( ) L , ( α π α π ≤  holds on 
all elements  W ∈ α . In ordinary vocabulary the π -function with the definition area 
W W 2 ×  is monotone on W  with regard to the second parameter on 
W 2 . 
Definition 2. Let  ) H ( V  for a non-empty subset  W H ⊆  by means of a given arbitrary 
threshold  u  is the subset  {} u ) H , ( : W ) H ( V ≥ ∈ = α π α . The non-empty H -set  
indicated by S  is called a stable point with reference to the threshold u  if  ) S ( V S =  
and there exists an element  S ∈ ξ , where  u ) S , ( = ξ π . See Mullat (1979,1981) for a 
comparable concept. Stable point  ) S ( V S =  has some important properties, which   
cannot be left apart, see later. 
Definition 3. By Monotonic System kernel we understand a stable point  max S S =
∗  with 
the maximum possible threshold value  max u u =
∗ .  
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Similar properties of Monotonic Systems and their kernels are under investigation; see 
Libkin et al. (1990), Genkin et al. (1993), Kempner et al. (1997), Mirkin et al. (2002). 
With regard to current investigation we have to make what we believe an important com-
ment. Given a Monotonic System in general form, without any reference to any kind of 
“interpretation mechanism”, one can always consider a bargaining game between a   
coalition H  −  the player nr.1, with characteristic function  ) H ( v , and the player nr.2 with 
the payoff function  ) H , ( min ) H ( F H α π α ∈ = . Following Nash theorem, a symmetrical 
solution has to be found in form (1). Below we are going to prove as well that our solution 
has to be found in the symmetrical or nonsymmetrical form (2). 
Definition 4. Let d  is the number of Boolean 1’s in table W . An ordered sequence 
1 1 0 − = d ,..., , α α α α  of distinct elements in the table W  is called a defining sequence if 
there exists a sequence of sets  p W Γ Γ Γ ⊃ ⊃ ⊃ = .   .   . 1 0  such that: 
A.  Let the set  {} 1 1 − + d k ,..., , α α α k k = H . The value  ) H , ( k k α π  of an arbitrary element 
j k Γ α ∈ , but  1 + ∉ j k Γ α  is strictly less than  ) ( F j 1 + Γ ,  1 1 0 − = p ,..., , j . 
B.  There does not exist in the set  p Γ  a proper subset L, which satisfies the strict ine-
quality  ) L ( F ) ( F p < Γ . 
Definition 5. A defining sequence is complete, if for any two sets  j Γ  and  1 + j Γ  it is 
 impossible to find  ' Γ  such that  1 + ⊃ ⊃ j j ' Γ Γ Γ  while  ) ( F ) ' ( F ) ( F j j 1 + < < Γ Γ Γ , 
1 1 0 − = p ,..., , j . 
It has been established that in arbitrary Monotonic System one can always find a complete 
defining sequence, see Mullat (1971,1976). Moreover, each set  j Γ  is the largest stable set 
with reference to the threshold  ) ( F j Γ . Now we can formulate our Frontier Theorem. 
Frontier theorem. Given a bargaining game on Boolean tables with an arbitrary set S  
of feasible alternatives  S ∈ H  the anticipations points  ) ( F ), ( v j j Γ Γ , p ,..., , j 1 0 = , 
of a complete defining sequence α  arrange a Pareto frontier in 
2 ℜ .  
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Proof. Let  S ∈
S W  is the largest set in S  containing all other sets  S ∈ H : 
S W H ⊆ . 
Let a complete defining sequence α
5 has been found for 
S W . Let the set 
c H  is the set 
containing all such sets  ) H ( V , where  {} ) H ( F ) H , ( : W ) H ( V ≥ ∈ = α π α . Notice that 
) H ( V H
c ⊆  and  ) H ( F ) H ( F
c ≥ . Now, to be accurate, we must distinguish between 
three situations: a) in the sequence α  one can find an index  j such that 
) ( F ) H ( F ) ( F j
c
j 1 + < ≤ Γ Γ   1 1 0 − = p ,..., , j , b)  ) ( F ) W ( F ) H ( F
c
0 Γ = <  and c) 
) ( F ) H ( F p Γ > . The case c) is impossible because on the set  p Γ  the function  ) H ( F  
reaches its global maximum. In case of b) the anticipation () ) ( F ), ( v 0 0 Γ Γ ,  W = 0 Γ , is 
better off than () ) H ( F ), H ( v  what concludes the proof. In case of a) let 
) H ( F ) ( F
c
j < Γ  - otherwise the equality  ) H ( F ) ( F
c
j = Γ  is the statement of the 
theorem (read the sentence after the next and change index  1 + j  to  j). But now the set 
c H  must coincide with  1 + j Γ ,  1 1 0 − = p ,..., , j , otherwise the defining sequence α  is not 
complete. Indeed, looking at the first element 
c
k H ∈ α  in the sequence α  one can   
establish that if not 
c
j H = + 1 Γ  then the set 
c
k H H =  because it is the largest set stable 
up to the threshold  ) H ( F
c . Hence the set  k H  represents an additional Γ -set in the  
sequence  α  with the property A of a complete defining sequence. Due to 
H H
c
j ⊇ = + 1 Γ  and the basic monotonic property the following inequalities 
) H ( F ) H ( F ) ( F
c
j ≥ = + 1 Γ  and  ) H ( v ) H ( v ) ( v
c
j ≥ = + 1 Γ  are true. Thus, the point 
) ( F ), ( v j j 1 1 + + Γ Γ  is better off than () ) H ( F ), H ( v .  
5.  Calculus of the Bargaining Solution.  
To summarize, we are under the jurisdiction of Nash bargaining scheme. Some reserva-
tions see, for example, Luce and Raifa, 6.6, hold as usual because our bargaining game on 
Boolean tables is purely atomic not allowing lotteries. Lottery is an important element of 
the whole story of bargaining. The bad thing is that if the lottery is not allowed, no one 
from the first glance can guarantee the uniqueness of the Nash solution. However, the 
good thing is that “...the Nash solution of  d , S  depends only on disagreement point d  
and the Pareto frontier of S . The compactness and convexity of S  are important only 
                                                           
5   We are not going to use any new notifications to distinguish in between Boolean tables W  and 
S W .  
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insofar as they ensure that the Pareto frontier of S  is well defined and concave. Rather 
than starting with the set S , we could have imposed our axioms on a problem defined by 
a non-increasing concave function (and disagreement point d )...”, see Osborn and 
Rubinstein (1990), p. 24 – in our case  ) ( F ), ( v j j Γ Γ ,  p ,..., , j 1 0 = , represents the 
atomic Pareto frontier. Therefore nothing can prevent us to implement the proof of   
non-symmetrical solution, see Kalai, 1977, p. 132, and to perform the calculus with the 
product of utility gains in its asymmetrical form (2).
6 The problem how to maximize the 
product is more technical one. From now on in the following we introduce an algorithm 
for that purpose. We will first comment the algorithm in lines with the definitions. 
The algorithm’s very last pass, see below, through the step T detects the largest kernel 
∗ = S K
7, Mullat 1995. The original version (Mullat, 1971) of the algorithm to detect the 
largest kernel looks like a greedy inverse serialization procedure, see Edmonts, 1971. 
Original version of the algorithm produces a complete defining sequence, what is abso-
lutely imperative for finding the bargaining solution subordinating with the Frontier   
Theorem. In view of current version it produces not complete defining sequence. As one 
can notice, it detects only some thresholds  j u , and only some stable set  j j S = Γ . The se-
quence  ,... u , u 1 0  is monotonically increasing:  ... u u < < 1 0  while the sequence  ,... , 1 0 Γ Γ  




W j , i
min ) W ( F u π 
∈
= = 0 . Therefore, the original algorithm always has a higher 
complexity. However, for finding the bargaining solution we still can implement the lower 
complexity algorithm. On this purpose we need to switch the indices  j ij c = π  to   
somewhat different. 




1 ) H ( F ) H ( v max arg H S  of the rows  x and columns  y in the original table 




ij k α ,  x i∈ . 
Let an index 
θ θ π
− ⋅ ⋅ =
1
j i ij c v r
8. Following algorithm solves the problem. 
                                                           
6   There are a lot of techniques to guarantee the uniqueness of the product of utility gains. We are not going to discuss this matter at all, 
because this case is rather an exemption than a rule. 
7   It may happen that some smaller kernels exist as well. 
8  This index obeys the basic monotone property as well.  




Step I. To set the initial values. 
 1i.  Assign the table parameter H  to be identical with W ,  W H ⇐ . Set minimum 
and maximum bounds  b , a  on threshold u  for  H ij ∈ π  values. 
Step A.  To find that the next step B produces a non-empty subtable H . Remember the 
current status of table H  by temporary table  ° H :  H H ⇐ ° . 
 1a.  Test  u as  2
) b a ( +  using step B. If it succeeds replace a  by u. If it fails  
replace b by u and H  by  ° H :  ° ⇐ H H  - “regret action”. 
 2a. Go to 1a.  
Step B.  To test whether the minimum of  H ij ∈ π  over  j , i  can be at least u. 
 1b. Delete all rows in H  where  0 = i r . This step B fails if all rows in H  must be 
deleted; proceed to 2b. The table H  is shrinking. 
 2b. Delete all elements in columns where  u ij ≤ π . This step B fails if all columns 
in H  must be deleted; proceed to 3b. The table H  is shrinking. 
 3b. Perform step T if none deleted in 1b and 2b; otherwise go to 1b. 
Step T.  To test that the global maximum is found. Table H  has halted its shrinking. 
 1t. Among numbers  H ij ∈ π  find the minimum  ij min π ← . Test performing step 
B with new value  min u = . If it succeeds put  min a = , return to step A. If it 
fails, final stop. 
6.  Boolean game cooperative aspects 
A cooperative game is a pair () v , N , where N  symbolize a set of players and ν  is the 
game characteristic function. Function ν  is called a supermodular if 
  ) G L ( ) G L ( ) G ( ) L ( ∩ + ∪ ≤ + ν ν ν ν  
and submodular for the inequality sign ≤  changed to ≥ , 
N G , L 2 ∈ . Among others, see 
also Cherenin et al. (1948), Shapley (1971), specifies various properties of supermodular 
set functions. In the appendix we illustrate a game, which is neither supermodular nor 
submodular, but somewhat mixture like game, where single and pair vise players do not  
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receive extra awards. On the other hand, it is obvious that all properties of supermodular 
functions ν  remain untouched for submodular  ν −  characteristic function or visa versa. 




) H ; x (
  ∂
∂
≡ π , where 







 if  H x∉ , the player x joins the coalition, and 







 if  H x∈ , the player x leaves the coalition, 
for every 
W H 2 ∈ . 






. A coalition game is convex (concave) if for any pair L and G of coalitions 

























   
 holds for each player  W x∈ . 
Theorem. For the coalition game to be convex (concave) it is necessary and sufficient 
for its characteristic function to be a supermodular (submodular) set function. 
Extrapolated from Nemhauser, et. al. (1978). 
9 
Now, in view of the theorem, marginal utilities of players in the supermodular game  
motivate them sometimes to form coalitions. In modular game, where the characteristic 
function is both supermodular and submodular, marginal utilities are indifferent to   
collective rationality; because of entering a coalition nobody wins or loose a side pay-
ments. On the contrary, collective rationality sometimes is counterproductive in   
submodular games. Therefore in supermodular games formation of too numerous   
coalitions might be immanent, for example the grand coalition; in Shapley’s (1971) words 
“snowballing” or “band-wagon” effect take place. On the contrary, submodular games are 
less cooperative. For the reason to counteract these “bad motives” of players both in   
supermodular and submodular games, we introduce below a second actor – the moderator. 
So, we consider a bargaining game between the coalition and the moderator. 
Convex (concave) game induces an accompanied bargaining game with utility pair 
() ) H ( F ), H ( v , where 
x
H
min ) H ( F H x   ∂
∂










max ) H ( F H x  
. Coalition itself 
                                                           
9   Shapley (1971) noticed this condition as equivalent, Nemhauser, et al. (1978) have proposed similar derivatives in their investigation 
of some optimization problems, Muchnik and Shvartser (1987) have pointed to the link between a submodular set functions and the 
Monotonic Systems, see Mullat (1971).  
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acts in player nr.1 role with the characteristic function  ) H ( v . The coalition moderator – 
the player nr.2 award equals  ) H ( F . 
Proposition. The solution  ) , ( f ∅ S  of a Nash’s Bargaining Problem  ∅ , S , which 
accompanies a convex (concave) coalition game with characteristic function v , lies on its 












j ) ( v  for some  p ,..., , j 1 0 = , and  1 0 ≤ ≤ θ . 
Proof: Statement is an obvious corollary from the Frontier Theorem.  




) H ; x (
  ∂
∂
≡ π  on 
N N 2 ×  it is not immediately apparent that there exists some 






. Following theorem, accommodated in lines of Muchnik and   
Shvartser, answers the question. 












) x H ; y ( ) H ; y ( ) y H ; x ( ) H ; x (
x
H









\ \ π π π π  
holds for  N H y , x ⊆ ∈ . The interpretation of this condition we leave to the reader. 
7. Heuristic  interpretation 
Only one, the last issue, is in place regarding our bargaining solution  ) , ( f ∅ = S Γ  in 
accompanied supermodular bargaining game. The coalition Γ  is a stable point with refer-
ence to the threshold value 
x




Γ . This coalition guarantees a gain 
) ( F u Γ =  to player nr.2. Therefore, by all means available to player nr.2, anyone  Γ ∉ x  
outside the coalition  S ∈ Γ  will be prevented to become a new member of the coalition  
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just because outsider’s marginal contribution 
x   ∂
∂ Γ
 brings down player nr.2 guaranteed 
gain. The same incentive of player nr.2 will prevent some members  Γ ∈ x  to leave the 
coalition. Following unconventional interpretation might highlight the situation. 
In short, observe a family of functions on 
N N 2 ×  monotonic towards the second set 
variable  H , 
N H 2 ∈ . Let it be a function 
x
H
) H ; x (
  ∂
∂
≡ π . We already cited Shapley, 
who introduced (1971) the convex games. Convex games marginal utility 
) x H ( ) H (
x
H




 is the one of many exact utilizations of suchlike monotonicity 
) G , x ( ) L , x ( π π ≤  for  G L x ⊆ ∈ . Some studies, including current research, call such 
like marginal  ) x H ( ) H ( \ ν ν −  set functions the derivatives of supermodular functions 
) H ( ν . Inverting the inequalities we get submodular set functions. 
Convex coalition game, we stress Shapley’s words (1971) once again, have some kind 
“snowballing” or “band-wagon” effect of cooperative rationality, i.e., in supermodular 
game the cooperative rationality suppresses the individual rationality. In submodular 
games with the inverse property  ) G , x ( ) L , x ( π π ≥ , on the contrary (an extrapolation 
this time), the individual rationality suppresses the collective rationality. So, in both cases 
it is a bad thing. The good thing what may happen, see above, a moderator might be in 




min ) H ( F u H x   ∂
∂
= = ∈  of some weakest player in the coalition H   
under formation. Now a two-person’s cooperative drama to be performed between the 
moderator and the coalition. 
We already approach our heuristic interpretation. Following the apparatus of monotonic 
systems in terms of data mining, Mullat (1971), it is reasonable to find the Pareto frontier 
also in terms of game theory. The moderator bargaining strategy might be. First, in the 
grand coalition  0 Γ ≡ N , the moderator finds out the players with the least marginal utility 
x
N
min ) N ( F u N x   ∂
∂
= = ∈ 0 , all together. Then the moderator will tell them to stay in line 
and wait for their awards. All players in line will be abandoned for a moment from any 
coalition formation. Following the game convexity, someone new player from the    
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remaining players (from players still remaining in the coalition formation process) must 
find themselves worse off owing their position to turn for the worse upon the abandoned 
players in line. Moderator suggests the new bad players, as well, to join the line and wait 
for their awards. The moderator continues the line construction. A moment 1 comes when 
all remaining players  1 Γ  (outside the line) are better off than  0 u , i.e., better off than those 
staying in line and who are still waiting for their awards. Now the moderator repeats the 
whole procedure upon players  ,... , 2 1 Γ Γ until all players from N  stay in line being ready 
to get their awards. Moderator, certainly, keeps some account about the events  ,... ,1 0  
when the marginal utility thresholds jump from  0 u  to  1 u , etc., occurs. It is obvious that 
the jumps occur only upwards:  p u ... u u < < < 1 0 . 
What happens? Players staying in line arrange a nested sequence of coalitions 
p ,..., , Γ Γ Γ 1 0 . Most powerful marginal players, the players when the very last event  p 
happens, form a coalition  p Γ . The next powerful coalition will be  1 − p Γ , etc., coming back 
once again to the start event 0, when the players arrange the grand coalition  0 Γ = N . Our 
Frontier Theorem guarantees that suchlike moderator bargaining strategy, in convex 
games, classifies a Pareto frontier  () ()   ,..., p p u ), ( u ), ( , u ), ( Γ ν Γ ν Γ ν 1 1 0 0  for   
bargaining game between the moderator and coalitions under formation.
 10 So, the game 
ends with bargaining agreement between the moderator and the coalition. However, some 
bad players might still stay in vain waiting for their awards, because the moderator might 
not agree to allow them playing a role in coalition formation. Yes indeed, just on those 
marginal players account the moderator may loose a lot of his award  ) ( F k Γ , for some 
p ,..., k 1 ∈ s ' . 
11 
8. Conclusion. 
Nash bargaining solution being understood as a point on the Pareto frontier in Mono-
tonic System might be an acceptable convention in the framework of “fast” calculation. 
The corresponding algorithm for finding the solution is characterized by a relative few  
operations and by known computer programming “recursive techniques” on tables. From 
theoretical point of view we believe that our technique represent an object to be noticed in 
the laboratory of game theoreticians. However, our bargaining solution is not yet totally 
                                                           
10 This sequence of players/elements in line arranges so-called defining sequence in data mining process. 
11 We refer to such players in “Bargaining Game Fiction about Welfare State, Poverty Line and Taxpayers”, 
see http://www.datalaundering.com/download/txdesign.pdf, as agents registered under the social security 
administration.  
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built on already validated scientific facts established in game theory. Consultations with 
the specialists of the field are necessary. We feel that our coalition formation games, one 
way or the other, become sufficiently clear, and do not need specific economic   
interpretations. Nevertheless, they need to be confirmed by other fundamental studies. 
Appendix.  Club formation bargaining game with neither supermodular 
  nor submodular characteristic function. 
Recall the health club formation game from section 2. Given the characteristic function 
) H ( ν  this time it will be secondary for us whether the club members actually arrive at 
individual payoffs or not, but the club formation is still of our interest. Let the game  
participants  {} 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 , , , , , , N =  try to organize a club. Let the characteristic (revenue) 
function comply with the promises of employees to participate in Damaging Behaviors in  
accordance with the survey, see table 1, however we demand that all 5 Damaging Behav-





j x a H ) H (
5
1
  ν , where  {} 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 , , , , , , N H = ⊆ . 
In other words, a promise fulfilled by the club member contributes a Bank Note to the 
player. In addition to all the promises fulfilled a side payment per capita is available. By 
this rule  {} 3 1 = ) ( ν ,  {} 5 2 = ) ( ν ,… Nonetheless, we are going to change the side   
payments rule at once so that the game turns into neither supermodular nor submodular 
game. Notice, that  {} { } ∑ = = =
7
29 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
i
) , , , , , , ( ) N ( ) i ( ν ν ν   , what yields the game to 
be not essential. Yes, indeed, the employees, cooperating or not, will be discouraged to 
form a club arriving at the same gains. To change the situation similar to “the real life  
cacophonous”, let the side payment per capita be removed for single and pair vise players 
keeping the awards in tact for all other coalitions, which size is grater than 2. Thus 
{} 2 1 = ) ( ν ,  {} 4 2 = ) ( ν ,  {} 6 2 1 = ) , ( ν ,  {} 5 6 3 = ) , ( ν ,  {} 12 5 3 2 = ) , , ( ν , etc… Moderator’s 
gain, which was defined as  () x H ( ) H ( v
x
H
min ) H ( F
H x





  , see above, makes the 
employees “cooperative behavior” close to grand coalition less profitable for moderator.  
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Therefore, we hope that the moderator will encourage employees to enter the club with 
“reasonable size”. Examine such like phenomenon observing some values of moderator 
gains  ) H ( F  in the table below. 
Table 8. 
Health Clubs List  Marginal Utilities p/capita  x   y  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  ) H ( ν ) H ( F
*         2         2  2 
  *          4        4  4 
*  *        2  4        6  2 
   *          3      3  3 
*    *       2    3      5  2 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -  -  - 
   *    *        3   2    5  2 
*  *  *     5    6   5     10  5 
 *  *  *       7  6   5     12  5 
* * *    *      3 5 4   3     15  3 
    *  *         4 2    6  2 
*     *  *     5     7 5    11  5 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - 
  . * * * * *    . 4 5 3 6 3  21 3 
* . * * * * * 3 . 4 5 3 6 3  24 3 
. * * * * * * . 5 4 5 3 6 3  26 3 
* * * * * * * 3 5 4 5 3 6 3  29 3 
At last, we illustrate the bargaining game by the graph below and make some comments. 



















Revenue Function equals to 
the total number of 
promises to keep by 
coalition members in the 
follow up inspection + 
additional award per capita 
for coalitions with not less 
than 2 members, |H| > 1. 
 
Figure 2.  
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N.B. Observe that utility pairs () 3 29, , () 4 20, , () 5 16,  and () 6 11,  constitute the Pareto fron-
tier of bargaining solutions for bargaining problem between the moderator as bargainer 
nr.1 and coalitions as nr.2, accordingly, i.e., the grand coalition  {} 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 , , , , , , N   = = Γ , 
three proper coalitions  {} 6 4 3 2 1 , , ,   = Γ ,  {} 6 4 2 2 , ,   = Γ  and  {} 6 2 3 ,   = Γ . Solutions 
() 4 20 1 1 = = ) ( F , ) ( Γ Γ ν  and () 5 16 2 2 = = ) ( F , ) ( Γ Γ ν   maximize the product of   
players gains over the disagreement point () 0 0,  at  80 5 16 4 20 = ⋅ = ⋅ , i.e., as we stated in 
the beginning of the paper, the solution might not be unique and some external considera-
tion may help, for example, the sponsor expenses for () 4 20,  which are equal to 24, while 
for  () 5 16,  expenses equal 21, might be decisive. That is the case, when the bargaining 
power  ½ = θ  of the coalitions  1 Γ ,  2 Γ  and the moderator are in balance. If not, choosing 
the coalition bargaining power  ½ < θ , the moderator will be better off   
materializing the solution () 16 5, . Coalition  2 Γ  will be better off if  ½ > θ . 

















Revenue Function equals to 
the total number of 
promises to keep by 
coalition members in the 
follow up inspection  + 
additional award per capita 
for coalitions with not less 
than 3 members, |H| > 2. 
 
Figure 3. 
N.B. Compare with Fig. 2 that coalition  {} 6 2 3 , = Γ  lies no longer on the Pareto frontier.  
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Revenue Function equals to 
the total number of 
promises to keep by 
coalition members in the 
follow up inspection + 
additional award per capita 
for coalitions with not less 
than 4 members, |H| > 3. 
 
Figure 4. 
N.B. Compare with that coalition  {} 6 4 2 2 , , = Γ  lies no longer on the Pareto frontier. 
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